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OVERCOMING TEXT IN AN AGE OF
TEXTUALISM: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
ARGUING CASES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Robert J. Gregory 1
As law students, we encounter the law largely through cases. We
learn that cases establish legal rules and that these rules develop organically through a process of case-by-case adjudication. As practitioners,
the law often appears in a much different form. Yes, cases play an important role in law development but, more often than not, the legal rule
that affects our client’s interest has its origins, not in the decision of a
court, but in an existing statute, ordinance, or regulation. Our job as
lawyers is to make sense out of the positive law by employing the tools
of statutory interpretation.
The practitioner’s task, when confronted with a governing statute,
is not an easy one. Statutes are often ambiguous. The rules of statutory
construction, ostensibly created to resolve statutory ambiguity, are, in
many cases, less than elucidating. It has been five decades since Karl
Llewellyn authored his famous article on the canons of statutory construction, demonstrating a fundamental truth about the process of statutory interpretation: that for every canon of construction leading to one
result, there is a corresponding canon, of seemingly equal weight, leading to the opposite result. 2 Llewellyn’s article typifies the legal realist
position, which views the process of statutory interpretation, as practiced
by courts, as the embodiment of result-oriented jurisprudence.
There is some truth in the realist critique, as anyone who has seen
action in the trenches of statutory disputes can attest. Most battles of
1. Mr. Gregory is a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This Article was written in the author’s private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other
agency of the United States government is intended or should be inferred.
2. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
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statutory interpretation play out like a fixed game of cards. One party
invokes the canon of statutory construction most supportive of its position. The other party invokes a contrary canon of statutory interpretation
supportive of its position. Sometimes, the parties invoke the same canon, quarreling over who may rightly claim the mantle of the preferred
canon (a frequent occurrence with the plain language rule, the most valued of the statutory canons). The court holds the ultimate trump card. If
the court desires to reach the result sought by party A, it relies upon the
canon invoked by that party. If the court desires to reach the result
sought by party B, it relies upon the canon invoked by that party. Rarely
is one firmly convinced that this process yields a result that is the product of neutral principles. More than likely, this process leaves an impression of a result in search of a supporting principle.
Although this feature of the interpretative process complicates the
life of the practitioner, there are ways in which the practitioner can make
sense out of the interpretative quagmire. Legal realists are undoubtedly
correct that there exists a certain deal of gamesmanship and manipulation in the use of canons of statutory construction. Yet, there is an important point that may be lost in the realist critique. Over time, seemingly contrary canons of construction emerge, each claiming at least some
support in case law. In particular eras, however, certain canons tend to
predominate over others. In one era, canon A may reign supreme. In
another era, canon B, A’s opposite, may emerge as predominant. Without discounting the views of the realists, it may be argued that the principles of statutory interpretation influence the outcome. The key is to
know, at any particular point in time, which set of interpretative principles carry the favor of the courts.
For most of this century, the prevailing view of statutory interpretation was one that denied the primacy of the bare text. The leading luminaries of twentieth century American jurisprudence—Holmes, Cardozo,
and Hand among others—disparaged what they perceived as an overly
technical reliance on the written word.3 They believed in an “archaeological” approach that dug beneath the text in its search for legislative
meaning. 4 The goal of statutory interpretation was to discern the under3. Learned Hand, for example, wrote that it was “not enough for the judge just to use a dictionary. If he should do no more, he might come out with a result which every sensible man would
recognize to be quite the opposite of what was really intended; which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose.” LEARNED HAND, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? in
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (I. Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
4. Professor Aleinikoff has used the “archeological metaphor,” referring to
“[i]ntentionalism” as the “second major archeological strategy,” one that “locates statutory law beyond, or behind, the statutory language.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean: Updating
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lying intent of the legislature; an intent that was often more clearly revealed by purpose and context rather than naked text.
An approach that emphasizes statutory purpose, at the expense of
the bare text, tends to favor those canons that permit a more flexible approach to statutory interpretation. Two canons cited in the Llewellyn article illustrate this point. Llewellyn cites, as one canon, the oft-cited rule
that “[e]very word and clause [of a statute] must be given effect.” 5 He
cites as its opposite the rule that, if “[a word or clause] is inadvertently
inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statute, [the word or clause] may
be rejected as surplusage.” 6 In an era that emphasizes the search for the
underlying “intent,” with text being one of many competing indicia of
that intent, the prevailing canon in this case is likely to be the latter canon because it permits rejection of the incongruous text as mere surplusage.
In recent years, the interpretative paradigm has moved, quite dramatically, in a different direction. The search for a more elusive statutory “purpose” or “intent” has given way to a strong emphasis on text; new
textualism, as one leading commentator has described it.” 7 The precise
contours of this new textualism are debatable, but without a doubt, it has
changed the rules of the game. Text, once a mere player in the broader
search for legislative meaning, has now taken center stage—framed by
its champions as the end of the statutory inquiry itself, rather than a subservient means to some other end. Arguments rooted in non-textual considerations, if not totally eviscerated, are not held in favor by the courts.
There has been a good deal of academic criticism relating to the
new textual hegemony in statutory interpretation. 8 For the practitioner,
however, the issue is more concrete. The practitioner may say, “I have a
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 22-23 (1988).
5. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 404.
6. Id.
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621 (1990) [hereinafter New Textualism]; see also Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments
in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1254 (2000) (using the new textualism terminology).
8. E.g., Bell, supra note 7, at 1261 (“Jurists who adopt new textualism purely for instrumental reasons impose severe societal costs by frustrating majority rule and denigrating the traditional
role of courts in dispute resolution.”); Eskridge, supra note 7, at 683 (“Perhaps the biggest problem
with Justice Scalia’s new textualism is that it seems unfriendly to democratically achieved legislation and threatens to undo much of Congress’ statutory work.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306-07 (1990) (criticizing the new textualists for
ignoring legislative history); Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 55-56 (the “new plain meaning” can “never
be an adequate theory of interpretation” because it “is not interested in searching for a sensible reading of a statute, one that would seek either to further the project begun by the enacting legislature or
to weave the statute into the warp and woof of the legal system”) (citations omitted).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 3
GREGORY1.DOC

454

1/22/2021 3:36 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

case involving the interpretation of a statute. I want to argue that the
statute means X. X is not clearly supported by the naked text. How do I
construct an argument, consistent with textual primacy, that achieves my
desired result?”
This Article attempts to provide the practitioner with an answer to
this question. First, the Article describes the historic movement from
purpose to text in the interpretation of statutes. In doing so, the Article
notes a critical feature of textualism as currently configured—that it
permits some flexibility (more than many people realize) in the interpretation of statutes. The Article next discusses the impact of the textual
movement on the process of arguing cases of statutory interpretation. In
particular, the Article sets forth three possible options available to the
practitioner when confronted with a statutory provision that does not, by
its naked terms, support the result sought by the practitioner. The primary goal is to suggest ways in which a practitioner can successfully argue,
within the textualist framework, for a result that is not, strictly speaking,
dictated by the naked text. Stated differently (and more candidly), the
Article seeks to assist the practitioner in using the rhetoric of textualism
to achieve a result that is textualist in form, if not in substance. Finally,
the Article roots this discussion in two real-world cases. It first analyzes
a recent Supreme Court decision that provides a model for the way in
which a party may use text-based arguments to achieve a result that
might be viewed as contra-textual. The Article then puts that model to
use in the context of another real-world example of statutory interpretation, yet unresolved.
I. A LITTLE BACKGROUND PLEASE
Statutes are given life in two stages. First and foremost, they are
created by legislative bodies. Second, they are construed and applied by
courts (or, in some cases, executive branch agencies responsible for their
enforcement). The practicing lawyer typically operates at the second
stage. The lawyer has a client. The client’s interests are potentially affected by a statute. The lawyer, on behalf of his or her client, seeks to
persuade a court to interpret the statute in a way that favors the client’s
interests.
The basic points surrounding the process of statutory interpretation
are not disputed. The legislature reigns supreme in the area of lawmaking. The legislature is comprised of elected officials. These officials are
responsible for determining statutory policy. At the federal level, the
lawmaking function has a constitutional dimension. Only Congress is
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given lawmaking powers. 9 In carrying out those powers, Congress must
follow carefully prescribed procedures that require, among other things,
a majority vote in both Houses of Congress. 10
Because lawmaking powers lie largely with the legislature, the role
of the judiciary is a subservient one. Courts do not possess formal lawmaking powers of their own. 11 They simply interpret and apply the laws
passed by legislatures. Because a court must give effect to the positive
law, it may not simply cast aside the legislative judgment and replace it
with a policy deemed more desirable.
Although courts play a subordinate role in the lawmaking process,
it is obvious to any keen observer that this role is far from ministerial.
Statutes are often ambiguous or vague. 12 This ambiguity is sometimes
inadvertent, the result of an oversight, a poorly chosen word, or a misplaced comma. In other cases, Congress deliberately avoids clarity in
order to secure enactment of legislation, writing at that level of specificity (or generality) where consensus is possible. In either case, the task of
interpreting or applying a statute involves some element of discretion.
The court’s job is to assign meaning to the words of the statute. But
how exactly does a court arrive at the proper meaning of a statute? Does
it look only at the words of the statute? Is it free to consult legislative
history? Should it rely more on the naked text or the statute’s objective
or purpose?
For a good part of the twentieth century, the predominant view of
statutory interpretation emphasized the statute’s purpose more so than
literal textual meaning. The chief proponents of this purpose-oriented
approach were Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, the leading authorities of
their day on issues of statutory interpretation. 13 The Hart and Sacks approach was based on the premise “that every statute and doctrine of unwritten law, developed by the decisional process, has some kind of purpose or objective. This approach applies even though it may be difficult,

9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
11. Of course, in deciding specific cases, courts do have the power to fashion common law
principles. See Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1975).
Those principles, however, exist only in the absence of a legislative mandate to the contrary. Swift
v. Philadelphia & R.R., 64 F. 59, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
12. In some circumstances, a statute is so vague that a court “is impliedly invited, and indeed
compelled, to supplement it with more specific rules.” REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 238-39 (1975).
13. For a discussion of the historic influence of the Hart and Sacks approach, see Aleinikoff,
supra note 4, at 26-28 (noting that Hart and Sacks “produced the most sustained intentionalist argument” and for years “dominated the interpretive scene”).
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on occasion, to ascertain or to agree exactly how it should be phrased.” 14
Hart and Sacks invited an interpreter to “identify the broader purposes
embodied in the legislation and answer the interpretive question in a
manner consistent with those purposes.” 15 The statutory text was relevant to the interpretive inquiry because “the words by which the legislature chose to express its intent” provided persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute.” 16 However, the bare text was not controlling.
“Literal interpretation dogma” was to be distrusted, 17 because it could
lead to a result which every sensible man would recognize to be the opposite of what the legislature intended.” 18
Many of the great legal minds of the early-to-mid twentieth century
favored the purpose-oriented approach that Hart and Sacks reflected in
their writing. Justice Holmes believed that a court’s job was to give effect to the “will” of the legislature, irrespective of whether that will was
found in the “terms” of the statute itself.19 Justice Holmes characterized
the plain meaning rule as “an axiom of experience [rather] than a rule of
law,” urging that courts were free to depart from the plain meaning of a
statute where there was “persuasive” evidence of a contrary intent. 20
Justice Holmes cautioned against treating the literal word as “crystal,
transparent and unchanged.” 21 Justice Cardozo shared the view that a
judge’s job was not merely “to match the colors of the case at hand
against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon [his] desk.” 22
The judge’s involvement begins “when the colors do not match—when
the references in the index fail” and at this point, a judge must fashion

14. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 34 (citing HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 166 (tentative ed. 1958)).
15. Id. at 24.
16. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
17. Id.
18. HAND, supra note 3, at 106.
19. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
20. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
21. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). Holmes also made the comment, oft-quoted
by the textualists, that, in construing statutes, courts “do not inquire what the legislature meant;
[they] ask only what the statute means.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920). But Holmes was no literalist. He understood the importance of context and was more than willing, in appropriate cases, to look beyond the
naked test in determining what the “statute means.” See, e.g., Johnson, 163 F. at 32
“The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the
enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say:
We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before”.
Id.
22. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21 (1921).
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law for the litigants before him, “acting within a statute’s interstices.” 23
Finally, Judge Hand was a frequent critic of courts that made “a fortress
out of the dictionary.” 24 Judge Hand believed that literalism risked
“pervert[ing]” a statute by “contradict[ing] or leav[ing] unfulfilled its
plain purpose.” 25 In Judge Hand’s view, “statutes always [had] some
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery [was] the surest guide to their meaning.” 26
In an era where purpose reigned supreme, the practitioner’s job was
to make sense of the statute. This included offering interpretations that
flowed, not from a grammarian’s parsing of the literal text, but from the
broader purposes of the statute and the surrounding legal context. Hyper-technical exercises in textual exegesis were not favored. Those canons calling for a flexible approach to statutory interpretation trumped
those insisting upon strict adherence to textual niceties or linguistic conventions. Remedial statutes were to be liberally construed; rules of
grammar were to be disregarded where strict adherence to such rules
would defeat the statutory purpose; courts were empowered to give effect to the manifest purpose of a statute even in the face of seemingly
unambiguous statutory language.
An example of the purpose-oriented approach in operation is provided by NLRB v. Scrivener, 27 a 1972 Supreme Court decision. Scrivener involved a claim of unlawful retaliation under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision made it
unlawful “for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the
Act.” 28 The claimants in Scrivener were dismissed from their jobs after
they gave sworn statements to the National Labor Relations Board, as
part of an investigation by the Board. The question before the Court was
whether the protections of the anti-retaliation provision extended to an
employer’s reprisal of an employee for giving testimony at a formal
hearing. 29 If not, it would place claimants, who merely gave sworn
statements to the Board, outside the protections of the statute.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the NLRA’s reference to an
employee who “has filed charges or given testimony” could be read

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 20-21, 129.
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
HAND, supra note 3, at 106.
Cabell, 148 F.2d at 739.
405 U.S. 117 (1972).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1968).
Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121.
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strictly and its reach confined to formal charges and formal testimony.” 30
The Court also noted that the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision had its
origins in a provision of the National Industry Recover Act, which, in
contrast to the NLRA, specifically referenced the giving of evidence
“with respect to an alleged violation.” 31 Nevertheless, the Court broadly
interpreted the anti-retaliation provision as protecting the employee during the investigative stage not only protecting an employee in connection
with the filing of a formal charge or the giving of formal testimony. 32
The Court ruled that this interpretation comports with the objective of
that section “to prevent the Board’s channels of information from drying
up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses.” 33 The Court also stated that its interpretation squares with the practicalities of appropriate agency action,” under which “[a]n employee
who participates in a Board investigation may not be called formally to
testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could testify.” 34 Finally, the Court stressed that the approach to the NLRA’s antiretaliation provision generally has been a liberal one in order to fully effectuate the section’s remedial purpose.” 35
There is much to commend in the purpose-oriented approach, as
applied in a case such as Scrivener. It is clear that by enacting the
NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision Congress sought to protect individuals
who assist the Board in investigating potentially illegal conduct. It
makes little sense “to protect the employee because he participate[d] in
the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or in the final,
formal presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important
developmental stages that fall between these two points in time.” 36 A
pure textualist might object to the expansion of the statute beyond its literal terms, as strictly construed. However, it is entirely reasonable to
read the anti-retaliation provision as protecting an employee who is fired
for giving sworn testimony to the Board.
The objection to the purpose-oriented approach is not rooted in cases such as Scrivener. It is rooted in cases where, under the rubric of
statutory purpose, judges adopt an interpretation that reflects their own
views rather than those of the enacting legislature. A decision that is of30.
31.
32.
33.
(1951)).
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 121-22 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485
Id. at 123.
Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 124.
Id.
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ten cited as an example of the purpose-oriented approach run amok is
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber. 37 In Weber, the Supreme Court
held that the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not condemn all private, race-conscious affirmative action plans. The Court reached this conclusion despite the
fact that Title VII, by its plain terms, prohibited an employer from discriminating against “any individual . . . because of such individual’s
race.” 38 The Court reached this conclusion despite compelling indications in the legislative history that the enacting Congress intended to
prohibit, not endorse, preferential treatment for members of a protected
group. 39 The Court rested its decision on what it described as the “spirit” of the statute. 40 The objective evidence of this “spirit” was thin. In
fact, almost every indicia of congressional intent pointed to a “colorblind” paradigm where any form of race-based discrimination was improper. Under a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation, one could
defend the result in Weber, based on intervening “practical and equitable” considerations and a changing legal context. 41 The Court’s interpretation, purportedly drawn from its reading of the original statutory
purpose, was questionable.
As it turned out, Weber marked the end of an era. Beginning in the
early 1980’s, Ronald Reagan began appointing self-described “strict
constructionists” to the federal bench. Many of these judges took a direct aim at cases such as Weber and at the interpretive method that produced them. One of those judges, Justice Scalia, quickly moved to the
forefront of the conservative critics. Justice Scalia embarked on a campaign to discredit the purpose-oriented approach to statutory interpretation. 42 Justice Scalia insisted upon a return to literalism as he argued
against the use of legislative history, which he viewed as extra-

37. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1979).
39. Weber, 443 U.S. at 231-55.
40. Id. at 201.
41. Id. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1987) (arguing that, because “the legal and
constitutional context of the statute may change” over time, an interpreter should “ask her self not
only what the legislation means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative history, but also what
it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society”) [hereinafter Statutory
Interpretation].
42. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7, at 650-56 (discussing Justice Scalia’s role as
an aggressive critic of the “traditional approach” to statutory interpretation). Justice Scalia mounted
a similar campaign against non-textualist approaches to the interpretation of the United States Constitution. See Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and Its Intellectual Incoherence, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997.
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constitutional and subject to manipulation by legislators and their committee staffs. 43 The result of these efforts was a shift to a new interpretive methodology—what some have described as a new textualism.” 44
The new textualism rests on the premise that “the constitutionallymandated role of the Court is to interpret laws’ using the actual statutory
language, rather than [to] reconstruct legislators’ intentions.” 45 From
that premise, new textualism lays down several basic principles: (1) The
text is not merely a means to an end—an aid, if you will, in ascertaining
congressional intent. Instead, it is the end itself. (2) Only the text is the
law; only the text represents the congressional will as expressed through
the constitutionally-prescribed procedures for lawmaking. (3) Ambiguities in the text should not be lightly inferred. Where they do exist, they
should be resolved, if at all possible, by applying the objective canons of
construction, particularly those that operate within the four corners of
the text. (4) Legislative history can never trump the plain text and
should not be used to resolve statutory ambiguity, except when the statutory language is hopelessly ambiguous or unclear. 46
A case that illustrates the new textualism in operation is West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey. 47 Casey involved a claim for
expert witness fees under 42 U.SC. § 1988, a federal civil rights statute.
This statute authorized an award of reasonable attorney’s fee as “part of
the costs.” 48 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held
that this statute did not authorize an award of expert fees. The Court
noted that the statute, by its literal terms, did not reference expert fees.
The Court also found that the record of statutory usage convincingly
demonstrates that “attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation cost.” 49 The Court cited numerous federal
43. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the ways in which committee reports and floor statements can be manipulated by those unable to
secure consensus for their positions).
44. E.g., Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7.
45. Id. at 653 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
46. As one commentator has noted, “most of the new textualists will consider legislative history if the other aids still leave the statutory meaning truly unclear.” Eskridge, New Textualism,
supra note 7, at 669.; But see Bell, supra note 7, at 1264-65 (stating that new textualists argue that
“only statutory text should create legal obligations and that legislative history does not provide a
legitimate source of legal obligations”).
47. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
48. The statute has since been amended to make explicitly clear that a court, “in its discretion,
may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (1994). The amendment
was passed in response to the Casey decision, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1074, 1079 (1992).
49. Casey, 499 U.S. at 88.
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statutes that, in contrast to Section 1988, expressly provided for an
award of expert witness fees. 50 The Court rejected the argument that
“the congressional purpose in enacting [Section] 1988 must prevail over
the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms.” It states that “the best evidence of that purpose is [that] the statutory text was adopted by both
Houses of Congress and [subsequently] submitted to the President.” 51
The Court then dismissed the argument that the Court’s interpretation
should be “guided by the ‘broad remedial purposes’” of Section 1988. 52
Finally, the Court took aim at the contention that “even if Congress
plainly did not include expert fees in the fee-shifting provisions of [Section] 1988, it would have done so had it thought about it.” 53 On this
point, the Court offered the following:
This argument profoundly mistakes our role. Where a statutory term
presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.
We do not do so because that precise accommodative meaning is what
the lawmakers must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress
know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role to
make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris. But where, as
here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not
our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy and
to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat
differently. The facile attribution of congressional ‘forgetfulness’ cannot justify such a usurpation. Where what is at issue is not a contradictory disposition within the same enactment, but merely a difference between the more parsimonious policy of an earlier enactment and the
more generous policy of a later one, there is no more basis for saying
that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier Congress felt differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness rests in reality upon the judge’s assessment that the later statute
contains the better disposition. But that is not for judges to prescribe. 54

In his dissent, Justice Stevens charged the majority with “put[ting]
50. Id. at 89 n.4 (citing, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (1994);
42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1994); 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (1994)).
51. Id. at 98.
52. Id. at 99.
53. Id. at 100. As the Court acknowledged this contention had carried the day in at least one
circuit court. See Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated 499 U.S. 933
(1991) (awarding expert fees under Section 1988 because a court should “complete . . . the statute
by reading it to bring about the end that the legislators would have specified had they thought about
it more clearly”).
54. Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01 (citation omitted).
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on its thick grammarian’s spectacles and ignor[ing] the available evidence of congressional purpose.” 55 Justice Stevens opined that, “excluding expert witness fees from the reach of Section 1988 was both arbitrary and contrary to the broad remedial purpose that inspired the feeshifting provision of [Section] 1988.” 56 It was arbitrary because the
term “reasonable attorney’s fee,” as used in Section 1988, permitted reimbursement for such items as paralegal and law clerk fees, attorney’s
travel expenses, and long-distance telephone calls, even though they are
not literally part of an ‘attorney’s fee,’ or part of ‘costs’ [as that term is
defined].” 57 According to Justice Stevens, the majority opinion was
contrary to the congressional purpose because the legislative history and
historic context indicated that Congress enacted Section 1988 with the
intent of allowing courts to shift fees, including expert witness fees. It
also intended to “make those who acted as private Attorneys General
whole again, thus encouraging the enforcement of the civil rights
laws.” 58 In Justice Stevens’ view, “[t]he fact that Congress has consistently provided for the inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting
statutes when it considered the matter is a weak reed on which to rest the
conclusion that the omission of such a provision represents a deliberate
decision to forbid such awards.” 59 Justice Stevens concluded with the
following statement, plainly intended as a rebuttal to the interpretive
methodology employed in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion:
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It
obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country
a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take time to revisit the matter’
and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work
product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error. . . . The Court
concludes its opinion with the suggestion that disagreement with its
textual analysis could only be based on the dissenters’ preference for a
‘better’ statute. It overlooks the possibility that a different view may
be more faithful to Congress’ command. 60

Casey marked the ascendance of one paradigm of statutory inter55. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with Justice Stevens that the majority had “[u]sed the implements of literalism to wound, rather than
to minister to, Congressional intent”).
56. Id. at 107-08.
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id. at 109-11 (citing, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4 n.3 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558,
p.1 (1976)).
59. Casey, 499 U.S. at 115-16.
60. Id. at 115.
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pretation and the denouncement of another. Justice Scalia, the new textualist, carried the day by insisting upon strict adherence to the statute’s
literal terms, looking outside the statute only for the purpose of drawing
a contrast between the text of the statute in question and that of other
federal statutes. Justice Stevens, the traditionalist, invoked, in a losing
cause, the rhetoric of the purpose-oriented approach, referencing the
views of Judge Hand and Justice Cardozo; 61 views that may very well
have carried the day only a decade or so before. 62 In 1989, the time of
the Casey decision, Justice Stevens could plausibly claim that in “recent
years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the
task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from
historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation.” 63 Since Casey, the “vacillation” has
been replaced by the steady drumbeat of textualism.
Those of us who practice under the new textualist regime are well
aware of its practical consequences. Arguments based on legislative history are held in contempt, at least where the history is cited as the primary source of legislative meaning.Arguments based on a statute’s remedial purpose are held in even less regard. The interpretive canons,
particularly those that seek to resolve ambiguity within the four corners
of the statute or by reference to the language of analogous statutes, are
strongly favored. If a party treats the text lightly, it does so at its peril.
Despite these developments, it would be a mistake to assume that
the new textualism has squeezed all flexibility out of statutory interpretation. First, even the most ardent textualists acknowledge that there are
cases, rare as they may be, where a court is entitled to depart from the
ordinary meaning of the statutory text. These situations arise when the
effect of implementing the ordinary meaning would be “patently absurd”
or the result would be demonstrably at odds with the intention of its
drafters.” 64 Justice Scalia has acknowledged that there may be a
61. Id. at 115-16 & n.19.
62. In his dissent, Justice Stevens cited several prior Supreme Court cases in which the Court
had “eschewed the literal approach.” Id. at 112 & n.11. One of the cases cited was United States
Steelworkers of America v. Weber. United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). Justice Stevens acknowledged that the dissenters in Weber “had the better textual argument” but urged that the Court had “opted for a reading that took into account congressional purpose and historical context.” Id. at 112 n.11. It seems clear that, in the decade between Weber and
Casey, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation underwent a significant transformation; almost assuredly, the Court that decided Casey would have decided Weber differently.
63. Casey, 499 U.S. at 112.
64. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489
U.S. 235, 244 (1989)).
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“scrivener’s error exception” to the canon that, where “the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to
its terms.” 65 Although committed to the result dictated by a statute’s literal terms, Justice Scalia has expressed a willingness to depart from
those terms where the literal interpretation produces an absurd or unworkable result. 66
More importantly, the Supreme Court has not abandoned the view
that the language of a statute must be read in the relevant context. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the “first step in interpreting a
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” 67
In the Court’s view, the “inquiry must cease if the statutory language is
unambiguous” (subject to the caveat for absurd results). 68 The Court has
also stated that the “plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.” 69 Under this standard, it is not enough for a court to focus solely on the literal meaning of words the of a statutory provision. A court
must examine those words in context, placing them within the specific
framework of the statute at issue as well as the broader legal framework.
Standing alone, the literal words may seem clear. Yet, a contextual
analysis might reveal an ambiguity. The analysis may evince that the
term has a common usage in the law that differs from its dictionary definition. Moreover, it may show that the literal reading of the provision
conflicts with (or undermines) other provisions in the statute. In either
case, a court would be justified in declaring the statute ambiguous and
engaging in a further explication of statutory meaning, based on legislative history or statutory purpose. As one commentator has observed, the
new textualism escapes the “no-context objection;” it “considers as context dictionaries, and grammar books, the whole statute, analogous provisions in other statutes, canons of construction, and the common sense
God gave us.” 70
65. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723-24 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 341.
70. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 7, at 669. Although the new textualism escapes the
“no-context objection,” there may be limitations on a party’s ability to exploit the broader context of
the statute to create ambiguity. In practical terms, the case for ambiguity is more easily made when
there is at least some play in the language itself. See discussion infra notes 133, 140 and accompa-
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This understanding of new textualism is critical. There is no doubt
that new textualism focuses the interpretive inquiry on the statute’s text.
However, the new textualists recognize the wisdom of Justice Holmes’
admonition that a “word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged.” Rather, it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used.” 71 There is room for maneuvering within the constraints imposed
by the new textualism paradigm. The question for the practitioner is
how to exploit that wiggle room to achieve a result that does not appear
to be supported by a statute’s literal terms.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES
With this background in mind, we now turn to the interpretative approaches available to the practitioner in cases where the text does not
clearly resolve the matter in the practitioner’s favor. Justice Cardozo
reminds us that “[l]awsuits are rare and catastrophic experiences for the
vast majority of men, and even when the catastrophe ensues the controversy relates most often not to the law, but to the facts. In countless litigation, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion.” 72 Justice
Cardozo also urges that, the serious business of the judge “begins in
those cases where the colors do not match; when the references in the
index fail.” 73 The same could be said for the practitioner, who must also
do his best work “when the colors do not match.” Let us assume that a
statutory provision does not clearly support the practitioner’s position.
Let us assume, in fact, that the literal terms of the statute seem to point
in a different direction. How does the practitioner respond?
A. The Plain Language Gambit
The first approach available to the practitioner is to invoke the plain
language rule. At first blush, this might appear foolhardy. The plain
language rule operates to a party’s advantage when the language of the
statute unambiguously supports the party’s position. In our scenario, the
literal terms of the statute work against the party’s position. Under these
circumstances, why bother with the plain language rule?
One reason is simple, the plain language rule is a powerful weapon,
especially in a textualist era. No one wants to cede away the textual
nying text.
71. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
72. CARDOZO, supra note 22, at 128-29.
73. Id. at 21.
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high ground; no one wants to readily concede that the language of the
statute does not clearly support his position. Parties fear that if they do
not invoke the plain language rule, their opponent surely will—to the
opponent’s advantage.
Truth be told, no canon of construction is more tortured than the
plain language rule. In most litigated cases, the interpretive issue is a
close one. If the language were truly plain,” the parties would not be in
court squabbling over its meaning. It is not uncommon for both sides in
a statutory dispute to claim the plain language mantle. Obviously, both
sides cannot be correct. In many cases, neither side is correct because
the language is not plain. The plain language rule is invoked because of
its rhetorical power; the Orwellian assumption, not entirely misplaced,
that by saying something is true you make it true.
An additional reason for invoking the plain language rule in seemingly inapposite circumstances is organizational. The Supreme Court
has stated that the interpretive inquiry begins with a statute’s text. Although the Court has indicated that an unambiguous text generally ends
the interpretive inquiry, a party rarely stops at the text. Typically, the
party first advances a textual argument. Next, the party marshals the relevant legislative history. Lastly, the party looks to the broader purpose
of the statute. This linear form of argument tends to provoke plain language arguments. A party wants to construct an argument in which the
text, history and purpose combine to create a clear picture of congressional intent. To strike the right note, at the textual stage, a party will
want to argue that the text is plain. The party will structure the argument
in this manner: the language of the statute is clear; any doubt on the
point is put to rest by the legislative history; the reading of the statute
supported by the text and history furthers the overall purpose of the statute.
An example of the use of the plain language rule, in seemingly hostile textual waters, can be found in a recent Supreme Court case, Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. 74 Adams involved the proper interpretation
of Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 75 That Section excludes from the reach of the FAA “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of worker engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” 76 On its face, this provision appears to betray an
ambiguity. Does the provision extend just to workers, such as seamen or

74. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
75. Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
76. Federal Arbitration Act § 1.
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railroad employees, directly involved in the transportation of people or
services in interstate commerce, or does the provision extend to some
broader class of workers, e.g., those “engaged in” interstate commerce?
Section 2 of FAA, the FAA’s coverage provision, further complicates
the picture because it extends the statute to a “written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.” 77 The phrase “involving commerce,” as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, 78 is broader than the phrase “engaged in” commerce,” as
used in Section 1 of the FAA. This suggests that the Section 1 exclusion
does not reach all employment contracts otherwise covered under the
Act. If anything, the language tends to support a narrower construction
of the Section 1 exclusion. Certainly, the statute would have to be classified as ambiguous.
Despite these textual points, the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae, invoking the plain language rule to argue that Section 1 of
the FAA broadly excluded all employment contracts otherwise subject to
the Act. The United States urged that the ordinary meaning of the Section 1 phrase excludes from the FAA all employment contracts that
could come within the FAA under Section 2. 79 The United States
stressed that, when the FAA was passed, the phrases “involving commerce” and “engaged in commerce” had identical dictionary definitions
and, thus, were interchangeable terms. 80 As the United States stated:
Absent indications to the contrary, Congress is ordinarily presumed to
have used the ordinary and common meanings of the terms it employs
in statutes. These ordinary meanings, however, are necessarily the
meanings of the terms at the time Congress enacted the statute.’ Dictionaries from the period when Congress enacted the FAA establish
that the terms ‘involved in’ and ‘engaged in’ had the same meaning. 81

Was this a credible use of the plain language rule? The point is debatable. As it turns out, there are strong arguments, rooted in history,
context and logic, that Congress intended to exclude all employment
contracts from the reach of the FAA. Would it not have been more persuasive for the United States to adopt the approach, discussed below, 82
of pointing out the ambiguities in the text and then turning to arguments
77. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
78. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
79. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379).
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
82. See infra part II.C.
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of history, context, and logic to make the case for a broader reading of
the Section 1 exclusion? Perhaps, but, to do so, would have arguably
ceded too much ground on the textual point. The United States chose
the more positive approach of wedding its arguments based on history,
context, and logic to a plain language argument. In these circumstances,
that approach can be defended. 83
So what are the downsides to invoking the plain language rule in
the face of a statute that does not, by its terms, seem overly supportive of
a party’s position. The most obvious is a loss of credibility. Judges
know that adversaries inflate the facts and the law. To some degree, this
is expected and tolerated. However, a party cannot push this judicial
grace too far. To invoke the plain language rule, when the language of
the statute is stacked against your side, risks a loss of credibility. To invoke the plain language rule when the statute is woefully ambiguous
presents a similar risk. When a litigant loses credibility in a court’s
eyes, it loses its most valuable asset.
A second problem with the plain language argument is a loss of
flexibility. When a party acknowledges that the statute is ambiguous,
the party can concede textual points without losing the war. The party
can point to those features of the statute that favor its position and those
features that do not. However, when the party rests an argument on the
plain language rule, there is little margin for error. Any perceived ambiguity may cause the plain language argument to unravel. The party must
constantly put out the “textual fire” by rigidly arguing in the face of contrary evidence, that a seemingly ambiguous statute is in fact unambiguous.
The final problem with the use of the plain language rule in these
situations is that it has the practical effect of forcing the party to either
win or lose the case on the plain language point. A statute may be ambiguous. A party may have strong arguments, based on history and purpose, that the ambiguity should be resolved in its favor. However, statutory arguments almost always begin with the text. When a party invokes
the plain language rule, it short-circuits its secondary, non-textual arguments. This is because the court itself will view the argument largely in
terms of the way in which it is framed by the party—either the language
is plain, in which case the party wins, or the language is not plain, in
83. Although the approach can be defended, as it turns out, it proved unsuccessful. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, adopted the narrow construction of the Section 1 exclusion, holding
that the exclusion “exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (2000). 532 U.S. 105, (2001). The
Court did not address the specific textual argument advanced by the United States. Id.
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which case the party loses (irrespective of the other indicia of congressional intent). Conceivably, a court could reconstruct the argument for
the party by holding that while the language is not plain, it is ambiguous
and the ambiguity can be resolved in the party’s favor. But courts are
reactive, not proactive decision-makers. If a party uses the plain language rule as the underpinning of its statutory argument, a court is likely
to take the party at its word. If the party loses on that point, the court
may well decide the case against the party without further inquiry. 84
What then is the proper approach to the issue? Does one employ
the plain language gambit? Or does one admit the ambiguity in a statute
and argue from there? Here, as in so many other areas of the law, it
comes down to a question of judgment. If the textual argument is a
close one, as it arguably was in the Adams case, the use of the plain language rule may be the most effectively persuasive device. However,
where a plain language argument cannot be credibly made, a party is
well-advised to stay away from plain language rhetoric. At best, use of
the plain language rule will be a distraction. At worst, it will defeat an
otherwise viable statutory argument. As we shall see, there are better
ways to exploit textualist thinking than to torture the plain language rule.
On a final note, the Supreme Court has indicated that the plainness
of a statute is to be determined “by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used and the broader context
of the statute as a whole.” 85 This means two things. First, a statutory
provision that is seemingly plain, viewed in isolation, can be rendered
ambiguous by an examination of the specific and general context. This
point is discussed further below. 86
How far can one push this point? Take, for example, a statute
whose literal terms, viewed in isolation, appear to support a plain language reading at odds with a party’s position. Can the party use the
“specific context” in which those words are used and “the broader context of the statute as a whole” to flip the result to a plain language reading in its favor? Not likely. Arguing from the inside out (from the literal terms of the statute, read in isolation, to the terms viewed in context)
is an effective way to create textual ambiguity. It is also an effective
way, in some cases, to resolve textual ambiguity. It is not a way, how84. This would not be a critical point if a party could simply argue in the alternative, i.e., “I
win because the language is plain or, if not, I win because the language is ambiguous and the other
indicia of congressional intent favor me.” However, there are practical difficulties in making alternative arguments of this nature. See infra part II.D.
85. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
86. See infra part II.C., part III.
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ever, to reverse entirely, the judgment of the literal language, standing
alone. The Supreme Court has left room for context, even at the threshold stage of determining “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language.” 87 It has not, however, left that much room. In this sense as
well, the plain language approach has its limits.
Second, a statutory provision that is seemingly ambiguous, viewed
in isolation, can be made plain by an examination of the specific and
general context. This, in effect, is what occurred in the Casey case, 88
where the Court eliminated the potential ambiguity in the statute (whether the terms “attorney’s fees” and “costs” were sufficiently broad to encompass expert witness fees) by comparing that statute to analogous
statutes.
B. The Textual End Run
The second option for the practitioner is to do a textual end run. As
noted above, even the new textualists concede that there may be cases in
which a court is authorized to digress from the statute’s plain terms.
These cases are rare, in their view, but they do exist where the effect of
implementing the ordinary meaning of the statutory text would be patent
absurdity or “demonstrably at odds with intentions of its drafters.” 89 A
party, confronted with hostile text, can opt to invoke this line of argument.
For obvious reasons, this is a high-risk strategy. Historically,
courts were willing to trump text to further the statutory purpose. For
example, in the Scrivener case, the Supreme Court relied principally on
the manifest purpose of the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision. 90 The
text was mentioned, but only peripherally. 91 Similarly, in Weber, the
Supreme Court was able to escape the plain language of the statute by
invoking the “familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers.” 92 These decisions, right or wrong,

87. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
88. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
89. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235,
244 (1989)).
90. The Court began its interpretive analysis with a discussion of statutory purpose. See
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972).
91. Id. at 122.
92. United States Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
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are relics of a by-gone era. 93 In the current interpretive milieu, any resort to statutory purpose as a source of legislative meaning independent
of text is likely to be met with a chilly reception.
At the very least, the practitioner should be aware of the difficulties
in pressing this type of argument. The new textualists are well-versed in
public choice theory. This theory states that because legislation is the
product of compromises among groups, “attributing a purpose to a statute may either: (1) improperly privilege the interests of one group over
another (thereby undermining the bargain); (2) or may impute a purpose
where none (other than the desire to reach agreement) existed.” 94 Adherents of public choice theory are highly skeptical of proposed interpretations that argue from some fixed statutory purpose. This is because
they are convinced that no such fixed purpose can be properly identified.
No statute has a single statutory purpose. Every statute is the product of
a give-and-take. To the public choice theorist, attempts to discern legislative intent from a statute’s purpose” are foolhardy. 95
A case that illustrates the public choice theory is Rodriguez v. United States. 96 In that case, a Circuit Court read the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 as superseding a prior federal statute that gave federal judges the authority to suspend the execution of certain sentences
and impose probation. The court did so despite the fact that the 1984
Act contained no explicit repeal of the prior statute. The court rested its
conclusion, in part, “on its understanding of the broad purposes of the
1984 Act, which included decreasing the frequency with which persons
on pretrial release commit crimes and diminishing the sentencing discretion of judges.” 97 The Supreme Court took issue with that approach.
The Court stated that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” 98
Deciding “what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative
choice and it frustrates, rather than effectuates the legislative intent by
assuming that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be
the law.” 99 The Court concluded that “where the language of a provision
is sufficiently clear in its context, there is no occasion to examine the
additional considerations of policy . . . that may have influenced the
93. The result in at least one of these cases, Scrivener, can be justified under a textual analysis. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
94. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 28.
95. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983).
96. 480 U.S. 522 (1987).
97. Id. at 525.
98. Id. at 525-26.
99. Id. at 526.
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lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.” 100
Rulings such as this reveal the difficulties that a party confronts
when attempting to end run text on the basis of an ill-defined statutory
purpose. It is not enough to invoke a statute’s “remedial purpose.” Nor
is it enough to show that the non-literal reading of the statute makes
more “sense”. The Supreme Court lectern is littered with the remains of
advocates who have constructed seemingly air-tight arguments as to why
Congress could not possibly have intended a particular result only to
have those arguments thrashed by skeptical Justices, who question the
ability of any onlooker to know what Congress really intended. To have
any prospect for success under this approach, the party must point to
something very concrete. The best case for a textual override is that the
statute is unworkable or dysfunctional if read in accordance with its literal terms, or that it is irrational to the point of absurdity and Congress
did not intend for absurd results. To trump text, the degree of irrationality must be severe.
If a party opts for this interpretive approach, it must be up-front.
The party must not invoke the old case law, recite the purpose-oriented
chestnuts from that case law (e.g., the “spirit” of the statute prevails over
its plain terms) and argue the case as if the purpose-oriented approach
were still in vogue. It must acknowledge, up–front, the extraordinary
nature of the argument, justify the reason for departing from the plain
text and make the best case possible.
If that sounds like an uphill battle, well, it is. As a stand-alone approach, the textual end run is a long shot. The approach might fare better, however, when paired with another interpretive approach. I return to
this point later. 101
C. Using Text to Bypass Text
We now turn to the third option left for the practitioner. By design,
the Article framed these approaches in “Goldilocks” fashion. The plain
language gambit is “too hot.” The textual end run is “too cold.” Now
comes the approach that is just right.” This Article promotes the view
that this approach using text to bypass text holds out the best chance of
overcoming seemingly hostile text.
This interpretive approach is simple enough to describe. The Supreme Court has made clear that the plain language of a statute typically
controls. The Court has also indicated, however, that, in determining the
100. Id. (citing Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)).
101. See infra part II.D.
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plainness of a statute, a court must look, not only at the language of the
particular statutory provision in isolation, but at the “specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.” A provision may, at first blush, appear clear. When examined,
however, in context, that clarity may disappear, causing the court to conclude that the statute is ambiguous. When a statute is ambiguous, the
court itself must resolve that ambiguity, and it may do so by reference to
the broader indicia of intent, such as statutory purpose. If a party can
persuade a court that the statute is ambiguous, and if the broader indicia
of intent favor that party’s position, the party can prevail.
The advantages of this approach are obvious. First, it deploys textualist ideology and rhetoric. The new textualism emphasizes the primacy of text; it instructs the interpreter to resolve the statutory dispute, if at
all possible, by reference to the text read in context. The textual bypass
approach does just that. It does not avoid the text; it welcomes the text
with open arms. The text is run through the ringer, examined, probed
and poked. Only when the end result of this textual exegesis is an unresolved ambiguity does the approach open the door to other indicia of intent, such as legislative history or a broader statutory purpose. This is
precisely the result advocated by the new textualism.
A second advantage of this approach is that it gives a party credibility and flexibility. Because this approach acknowledges the possibility
of ambiguity, a party is not required to use the plain language feint—to
pretend as if an ambiguous statute is in fact clear. A party, moreover,
need not maintain an air-tight ship. The party may concede that the statute is less than pellucid. The party can even concede that certain features of the text favor the other side’s position. Indeed, the argument
can be structured as a tit-for-tat, i.e., here are the features of the statute
favoring my position, here are the features favoring the other side’s position. So long as the argument leaves some room for doubt, the party has
done all it needs to do to open the statute to a broader interpretive inquiry.
Differences between this interpretive approach and the plain language gambit are evident. The plain language approach requires a party
to argue the case as if the statute were crystal clear. In cases where the
text appears to favor the other side, such an argument may not be credible. The plain language approach also requires a party to hold the text in
a vise grip. A party cannot concede a single textual point or else the
plain language argument begins to unravel. In using text to point out
statutory ambiguity, a party avoids being forced into what may be an unreasonable statutory argument.
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Despite the obvious advantages of this interpretive approach, there
are some potential downsides. First, in interpretive battles, one is always reluctant to concede away a textual point. Most lawyers prefer to
take the offensive. Most courts expect nothing less than the most aggressive, some might say shrill, lawyering. By conceding ambiguity, a
party assumes a defensive posture. A party effectively concedes that the
statute does not clearly support its interpretation. This could be perceived by the court as a sign of weakness; an admission that the text
does not support that party’s position. This stands in contrast to the
plain language approach which presents the statutory argument in the
most positive light.
A second downside is that a party must cross two rivers to reach the
other side. A party must first convince a court that the statute is ambiguous. This, itself, may be no easy task, but it is only half the battle. To
prevail, the party must also persuade the court that the unresolved ambiguity in the statute should be resolved in that party’s favor. This provides a contrast with the plain language approach. Under that approach,
there is rarely a second act. If a party persuades the court that the language clearly supports that party’s position, the matter ends (except in
those rare cases in which the court is willing to set aside the plain meaning of the statute).
These factors suggest that the textual bypass approach is not for
every case. If the textual arguments are close and the broader indicia of
intent do not clearly favor a party’s position, the party may be better off
taking its chances with the plain language approach. However, the analysis changes if the party is likely to lose the textual battle (if argued as a
dueling plain language case), and there are compelling arguments of history, purpose and logic that favor the party’s position. In that circumstance, the optimal interpretive strategy is one that argues for textual
ambiguity, thereby providing a text-centered argument for bypassing the
unfavorable text and reaching the more favorable, secondary sources of
legislative meaning.
D. The Combination Approach
The above discussion assumes that these interpretive approaches
are mutually exclusive. This, of course, is not necessarily true. Litigants
can make multiple arguments in the alternative. At least in theory, it is
possible for a party to combine interpretive approaches in a single case.
The most obvious pairing of interpretative approaches brings together the two non-plain language approaches, the textual end run and
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the textual bypass. In a case in which the plain language approach is not
available to a party, a party has two choices: (1) argue that this is the
type of case in which the court can set aside the statute’s plain meaning;
or (2) argue that the statute is ambiguous. A party does not have to
choose only one approach. It may argue that the text is ambiguous and
that the ambiguity should be resolved in the party’s favor, and, in the alternative, argue that the broader indicia of intent are so compelling that
they trump the statute’s literal terms, even assuming that those terms are
not ambiguous.
In using this combination approach, it is critical that the party begin
with the approach that is most text-centered. That is, begin the argument
by making the case for textual ambiguity and then turn to the textual end
run as a fallback argument. Again, in the new textualism era, any argument that places text first is favored.
The combination that seems most unlikely is the pairing of the plain
language gambit and the textual end run. The plain language approach
argues with confidence that the terms of the statute plainly support the
party’s position. If the language is truly plain (or at least arguably so), it
is non-sensical to argue that the language plainly supports the other
side’s position, thus requiring a textual override. Of course, in advancing the plain language argument, a party will want to follow the textual
argument with a discussion of the relevant history, context, and purpose.
The party should frame that discussion as supportive of the plain meaning argument; it should not pit these broader indicia of intent against
text.
The more difficult pairing is that of the plain language gambit and
the textual bypass. It might appear that these two approaches are easily
wed. A party starts by invoking the plain language rule. The party argues that the statute’s plain terms support its position. The party argues,
in the alternative, that the statute is ambiguous and that the ambiguity
should be resolved in the party’s favor.
In practice, it is much harder to achieve a bond of these two approaches. Legal briefs are written with a single voice. They have a central theme, a thesis, that carries through the brief. In the context of interpretive arguments, the defining moment of the brief is the initial
textual volley. If a party sounds the plain language theme, that theme
typically sets the tone for everything that follows. Although it is not unusual for litigants to advance alternative arguments, the shift in emphasis, from “the statute is plain” to the “statute is ambiguous,” is awkward,
at best, self-defeating, at worst.
Indeed, there are structural problems with attempting this combina-
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tion approach. A party begins by arguing plain language. The party
then shifts gears completely by arguing that the statute is ambiguous. To
make this argument persuasively, the party must unpack or deconstruct
the statute. The party might begin by pointing to the ambiguities in the
statutory provision at issue. The party may expand the inquiry to draw
comparisons to other provisions of that statute or other related statutes to
create ambiguity in the statute. Finally, the party might point to broader
contextual factors, such as the law predating the statute’s enactment, in
an attempt to raise ambiguity. By the time the party is finished, it may
have emphasized the ambiguity to such an extent that it harpooned the
initial plain language argument.
Take for example a statute that provides rules for the registration of
“cats, dogs and any other animal.” If a party wants to argue that these
rules apply to horses, the party must begin with a plain language argument. The party may argue that the phrase “any other animal,” by its
plain terms, applies to horses. In the alternative, the party may argue
that the statute is ambiguous but should be construed as covering horses.
The party could acknowledge that, under the interpretive canon known
as ejusdem generis, the phrase “any other animal” is construed in the
context of the list that precedes it. This arguably supports a narrower interpretation of the phrase, limiting its reach to other domestic pets such
as cats or dogs. Moreover, the statutory section of which this provision
is a part appears to contemplate regulation of domestic pets; most of the
provisions focus on domestic pet issues.
On the other hand, assume that there is a closely related statute
governing a different issue of animal regulation that uses the phrase
“cats, dogs and any other domestic pet.” This suggests that the use of
the phrase “any other animal,” in the statutory provision at issue, was intended to give the provision a broader reach. From this, the party may
urge that the statute is ambiguous and in need of judicial explication
based on the broader indicia of intent (which, in this case, support the
party’s position). The party may have made a convincing case for statutory ambiguity, resolved in the party’s favor by the broader manifestations of intent. However, by doing so it has undermined completely the
initial plain language argument. The party, in effect, has argued against
itself.
Of course, one can always argue that the language of a statute is
plain and simply acknowledge, in passing, the possibility of an ambiguity. In other words, the party can make a plain language argument, note
that the statute is possibly ambiguous, and then proceed to the other indicia of intent —–such as context, purpose and history. However, this is
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not a combination of the plain language and textual bypass approaches.
It is simply a deployment of the plain language approach with a slight
disclaimer or safety valve added to the argument. To effectively argue a
case under the plain language and textual bypass approaches, is a difficult, if not impossible feat.
This discussion suggests that, in making an interpretive argument in
those cases in which the text might appear to be less than supportive, a
party must carefully choose an interpretive strategy. A party must
choose between the plain language gambit and the textual bypass, each
of which has its advantages and disadvantages. The choice of interpretive strategy will dictate the way in which the argument is constructed
and, ultimately, the success or lack of success of that argument.
III. A SUPREME COURT PARADIGM: ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO.
With these approaches in mind, we can now turn to a real-world
example. The example is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it
illustrates the benefits of the textual bypass approach. Second, it suggests how a party can achieve the same result, in textual terms, that
would have been achievable in non-textual terms under prior interpretive
paradigms. Finally, it raises questions about how far the textual bypass
approach can be pushed, which in turn transitions nicely into the last
section of the Article.
The real-world example is Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 102 Robinson
involved a claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 103 The plaintiff in Robinson had been fired from his
job with the defendant. The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After the charge
was filed, the defendant provided a negative job reference to a prospective employer of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
provided the negative reference to the plaintiff as a retaliation for the
charges that the plaintiff filed against the employer. The plaintiff argued
that the negative reference was an unlawful retaliation under Title VII.
The defendant argued that the protections of Title VII did not extend to
the plaintiff’s claim because Title VII only protected employees, not
former employees, from unlawful retaliation.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant. 104
102. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
103. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
104. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 519 U.S. 337
(1997).
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The Court of Appeals relied on the plain language of the statute, 105
which makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment” because of the protected
activity (e.g., charge-filing) of those employees or applicants. 106 The
court ruled that, by its plain terms, the statute extends to employees and
applicants for employment, not former employees. The court acknowledged that a number of circuit courts had read the statute more broadly
but asserted that these decisions “depend on broad policy arguments not
supported by the plain language of Title VII.” 107 The court concluded
that because Congress had chosen, “in no uncertain terms,” not to protect former employees, the court was not free to interpret the statute in
accordance with the “underlying policies” of the anti-retaliation provision. 108
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robinson and unanimously
reversed the Fourth Circuit decision. The Supreme Court stated that the
“first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” 109 The Court stressed that “a court’s inquiry
must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent.” 110 The Court proceeded to clarify
that “the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 111
With these precepts as its guide, the Court concluded that the language of the statute did not unambiguously foreclose coverage of former
employees. The Court acknowledged that, “[a]t first blush, the term
‘employees’ in [the anti-retaliation provision] would seem to refer to
those having an existing employment relationship with the employer in
question.” 112 The Court determined, however, that “[t]his initial impression” does not withstand scrutiny in the context of [the anti-retaliation
provision].” 113 The Court stressed that “there is no temporal qualifier in

105. Id. at 331-32.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
107. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332. The Court described these decisions as “at odds with the wellsettled rule that in the absence of expressed Congressional intent, courts must assume that Congress
intended to convey the language’s ordinary meaning.” Id.
108. Id. at 332.
109. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 341.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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the statute such as would make plain that [the anti-retaliation provision]
protects only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation.” 114 In
particular, the statute defines the term “employee” to mean an individual
employed by an employer,” not an individual who “is employed” by an
employer. 115 The Court found additional ambiguity in the simple fact
that the term “employee” does not have some intrinsically plain meaning” that renders the term unambiguous. 116 Finally, the court deemed it
significant that “a number of other provisions in Title VII use the term
‘employees’ to mean something more inclusive or different from ‘current employees.’” 117 The Court concluded that, “[o]nce it is established
that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in some sections,
but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous.” 118
Having concluded that the statute was ambiguous, the Court assumed the role of resolving that ambiguity. 119 The Court did so by looking to the “broader context” of the statute, which seemed to “contemplate that former employees would make use of the remedial
mechanisms of Title VII.” 120 The Court also drew support from the
plaintiff’s argument that the word ‘employees’ includes former employees because to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by the [anti-retaliation provision].” 121 The Court agreed
with the plaintiff “that it would be destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an employer to be able to retaliate with impunity
against an entire class of acts under Title VII.” 122
Robinson provides a virtual road map for using textual argument to
dodge a seemingly hostile text. The vehicle for doing so is the textual
bypass approach. The Court invoked the rhetoric of the new textualism.
The Court made clear that statutory text, seemingly plain, could be

114. Id.
115. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 342 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)).
116. Id. at 344 n.4.
117. For example, Section 717(c) of Title VII provides that an “employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved, by the final disposition of his complaint, . . . may file a civil action . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (1996). Given “that discriminatory discharge is a forbidden ‘personnel action[n] affecting employees,’ the term ‘employee’ in [Section] 717(c) necessarily includes a former
employee.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343 (citation omitted).
118. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343.
119. Id. at 345.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 346. As the Court explained, exclusion of former employees “would undermine the
effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of post-employment retaliation to deter victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employees to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.” Id.
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viewed as ambiguous when read in context. The Court construed the anti-retaliation provision by referencing other provisions in Title VII; provisions that seemed to belie the argument that the protections of the statute did not extend to former employees. Having reached the conclusion
that the statute was ambiguous, the Court went on to assign meaning to
the statute, based on broader arguments of context, purpose and logic.
What makes Robinson significant is that the Court reached its conclusion in terms that are acceptable to the new textualists. Historically, a
number of circuit courts had concluded that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision applied to former employees. These courts had done so largely on non-textual grounds, invoking the purpose-oriented approach to
statutory interpretation. In one case the court acknowledged that the
words of the statute, “[r]ead literally,” might exclude former employees
from the reach of the anti-retaliation provision. 123 However, the court
ruled that such a narrow construction would not give effect to the statute’s purpose, stressing that there is no better guide to the ‘“interpretation of a statute than its purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed.’”124
In another case, the court determined that “a strict and narrow interpretation of the word employee’ to exclude former employees would undercut
the obvious remedial purposes of Title VII.” 125 The court opined that
the “plain meaning rule should not be applied to produce a result which
is actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute.”126
It is questionable whether the rationale of these decisions survives
the shift in interpretive paradigms that has taken place over the past few
decades. Certainly, the proponents of the new textualism would be
skeptical of any approach that denied the primacy of the written word.
Yet, in Robinson, the Supreme Court unanimously reached the same result that had been reached in these prior circuit court decisions. The key
is that the Court did so by focusing principally on text. The Court invoked the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision but only after it carefully sifted through the text and concluded that the statute was ambiguous. Robinson proves the central point of this Article—that, in an age of
textualism, the way to overcome seemingly hostile text is not to fight the
text (or to ignore it) but to use textualist rhetoric to create ambiguity and
thereby broaden the interpretive inquiry.
It is instructive in this regard to consider how cases decided under
the now discarded purpose-oriented regime might fare under the textual
123.
124.
125.
126.

Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1055 (quoting Fed. Ins. Deposit Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1943)).
Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988).
Id.
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bypass approach as articulated in Robinson. For example, in Scrivener, 127 the Supreme Court held that the NLRA’s anti-retaliation provision extended to individuals who gave “sworn statements” to the Board.
The Court’s analysis, rooted principally in the “objective” of the statute,
might be passe. Yet, the Robinson approach might well have produced
the same result. The statute in Scrivener protected individuals who had
given “testimony.” The term “testimony” is not unambiguously restricted to oral testimony in a formal hearing. 128 More fundamentally, the
statute contemplated the participation of individuals in board proceedings under circumstances that would not produce formal testimony.” 129
This suggests that the language of the statute was ambiguous when
viewed in “the specific context in which that language [was used], and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 130 Had the Supreme Court
documented this ambiguity, it could have then turned to the broader indicia of intent to resolve that ambiguity, rather than relying upon those
indicia in the first instance; the very anti-textual approach that raises the
ire of the new textualists. One could easily rewrite the opinion in
Scrivener to reach the same result in terms that would meet the demands
of the new textualism.
Although Robinson provides a blue print for arguing cases of statutory interpretation in a textualist era, it leaves some questions unanswered. In Robinson, the Court first examined the specific language of
the statutory provision at issue. The Court found this language to be
ambiguous. The Court then looked outward, examining other sections of
the statute for signs that Congress had some fixed understanding of statutory coverage. This statutory outreach confirmed the ambiguity that
was in the specific language itself. Robinson suggests that the “plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 131 However, there was no
need to look beyond the language itself” because the language was ambiguous, a point that the broader context” merely confirmed.
In other cases, the words of the statutory provision, in isolation,
might not be ambiguous. Yet, when examined against the broader con127. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
128. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1218 (1998) Testimony is defined as
“a firsthand authentication of a fact.” Id.
129. NRLB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 124 (1972). The Scrivener Court raised this feature of
the statute, but only as a secondary point; it began its analysis with the “objective” of the statute. Id.
at 121. The new textualist would insist that the interpretive analysis begin with the text.
130. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
131. Id.
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text of the statute as a whole,” an ambiguity might emerge. This presents a different scenario than the one in Robinson where there was ambiguity at every step of the analysis, working from the inside out. Robinson seemingly supports the view that an ambiguity at any step of the
analysis is enough to take the case out of the plain language rule. It must
be acknowledged, however, that the textual bypass becomes more difficult when the “language itself” and “the specific context in which that
language is used” do not point to any ambiguity; thus, leaving only the
more amorphous argument that the statutory language is ambiguous
when determined by reference to the “broader context of the statute as a
whole.” A party may have a strong argument of statutory ambiguity
based upon the broader context of the statute. If at all possible the party
should first try to suggest some ambiguity in the language of the statutory provision itself. Even assuming that the “broader context” of the statute might support the existence of a statutory ambiguity, it is a risky
strategy when employing the textual bypass approach to concede a lack
of ambiguity in the “language itself.”
IV. THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES IN PRACTICE: A CASE IN POINT
It is now time to put into practice the principles discussed in this
Article. To do so, I turn to an issue of statutory interpretation that is currently wending its way through the federal courts of appeals. The issue
concerns the scope of the anti-retaliation provisions of the federal antidiscrimination statutes. The issue is not the same issue of statutory interpretation that occupied the Supreme Court’s attention in Robinson.
Nevertheless, the Robinson decision may well have some bearing on
how this issue is resolved.
In particular, let us focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. That statute makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against
employees or applicants who have engaged in protected activity under
Title VII. Specifically, the statute provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment,
for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-thejob training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
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made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 132

In Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed one of the interpretive
issues raised by this provision (i.e., the protection of former employees).
There are, however, other interpretive issues. One such issue is whether
the protection of this provision extend to cases of third-party retaliation
where the employer retaliates against one employee because of the protected activity of another.
In the prototypical retaliation case, an employee engages in some
protected act, such as filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The employer responds by taking some adverse action against that employee. However, In some cases
the employer does not take action against the employee who has engaged in the protected activity, but instead, targets an employee who is
associated in some way with the employee who has engaged in the protected activity. The targeted employee may be a close relative of the
employee who engaged in the protected activity or the individual on
whose behalf the other employee engaged in protected activity. (The
other employee, for example, may have opposed a discriminatory act directed at the targeted employee. The employer then retaliates against the
targeted employee rather than the employee who opposed the discriminatory act.) In either case, the employer has taken adverse action in retaliation for protected activity; however, the employer has not taken action against the individual who actually engaged in the protected
activity.
A cursory look at the text of the statute reveals the problem. The
statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he [employee
or applicant] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” 133
The use of the term “he” implies that the statute prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee when that employee engages in
protected activity. Read literally, the statute could be construed as not
applying in cases in which the employer retaliates against one employee
because of the protected activity of another employee (or individual).
Courts have split over the question. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the anti-retaliation provision extends to cases of third132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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party retaliation, “i.e., discrimination against one person because of a
friend’s or relative’s protected activities.” 134 The Sixth Circuit has
stressed that “courts have frequently applied the retaliation provisions of
employment statutes to matters not expressly covered by the literal terms
of these statutes where the policy behind the statute supports a nonexclusive reading of the statutory language.” 135 The Fifth Circuit, by
contrast, has rejected the third-party retaliation theory. 136 Invoking the
“plain language” rule, that court has limited the reach of the antiretaliation provision to cases in which the target of the retaliation has
himself engaged in protected activity. 137
For reasons that should be obvious, this interpretive dispute provides an excellent illustration for the interpretive approaches discussed
in this Article. There is a compelling argument that the purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision would be compromised if an employer were
free to retaliate with impunity against the spouse or friend of an employee who has engaged in protected activity. Yet, the literal terms of the
statute might support just such a narrow reading of the provision. Historically, the manifest purpose of the anti-retaliation provision might
have carried the day in any interpretive dispute. Under the new textualism paradigm, such a purpose-oriented approach might well fail. This
presents a challenge for the party seeking a broader reading of the antiretaliation provision. How best to make the case for a reading of the
statute that would cover the claim of an employee who suffers an adverse employment action because of the protected activity of another
employee?
Clearly, this is not a case in which the plain language gambit is a
viable option. There may be some wiggle room in the text that is suffi-

134. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573 (D.C. 1978), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
135. Id. at 545.
136. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224 (5th Cir. 1996). Holt involved a claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2001). That statute, however, contains an anti-retaliation provision that is virtually identical to the provision in Title VII.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2001).
137. Holt, 89 F. 3d at 1226-27. Another circuit court has agreed with Holt, although without
much analysis of the issue. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1998). The
issue has also been addressed in a number of district court decisions, with varying results. See, e.g.,
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 788 (M.D. Penn. 2000) (no coverage); Thomas v.
Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 1999),
aff’d 205 F.3d 1324 (2000) (coverage); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D.
Cal. 1998) (coverage); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, 946 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(coverage).
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cient to create a statutory ambiguity. However, the language of the statute cannot be read as plainly supporting the position that the statute prohibits third-party retaliations. As discussed above, in many interpretive
disputes, the critical, tactical decision is whether to argue the case in
plain language terms or concede ambiguity. In this case, the statute
makes the decision for the party. The plain language argument is simply
not available.
On the other hand, this case seems well suited for the textual end
run. There is a very strong argument that the purpose of the antiretaliation provision would be thwarted if employers were free to engage
in third-party retaliations. An employer could target non-participating
employees for retaliation and engage in a campaign of purging protected
activity from the workplace; the very thing that the anti-retaliation provision seeks to guard against. The problem is that, in an era governed by
the new textualism, the textual end run is at best a long shot. The textual
end run might work as an alternative argument in combination with the
textual bypass approach. However, to base the statutory argument on
nothing more than a non-textual, purpose-oriented analysis is a risky
proposition that is likely to incur the wrath of a textualist judge who will
want to see, at least, some textual analysis.
This leaves the textual bypass approach. In some ways, the thirdparty retaliation issue closely resembles the issue before the Supreme
Court in Robinson. As in Robinson, the dispute focuses on the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. As in Robinson, the party seeking
coverage is confronted by a text that is not plainly supportive of coverage. As in Robinson, there is a compelling argument that the purpose of
the anti-retaliation provision would be thwarted if the provision were
given a narrow reading. Despite these similarities, there is one critical
difference. In Robinson, the dispute turned on whether the term “employees” necessarily meant “current employees.” The Court was able to
say that the statute was ambiguous because the term “employee” does
not necessarily mean “current employee” and the statutory definition of
“employee”—an “individual employed by an employer”—contains no
temporal qualifier. In the case of third-party retaliations, the dispute
turns on the fact that the statute refers to retaliation against an employee
because “he”—the employee—has engaged in protected activity. The
ambiguity that was relatively easy to identify in Robinson does not exist
on this issue. Thus, if a party is to argue ambiguity based on the “language itself,” it must do so on some other ground. As discussed above,
it is possible to bypass the language of the statute in isolation and argue
ambiguity on the basis of the “broader context of the statute as a
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whole.” 138 This approach, however, may concede too much. In theory,
a textualist judge might be willing to accept an argument based on a contextual analysis. In practice, however, failing to identify some ambiguity in the literal words themselves could be fatal. Textualists are not fond
of any argument that requires a judge to supplement or modify the language of a statute. It is one thing to extend the coverage of a statute by
construing ambiguous language. It is another thing to extend coverage
by construing language that, on its face, seems clearly to foreclose coverage. The textualist judge must be given a certain comfort level. To do
so, it helps immensely that, context aside, the “language itself” is ambiguous.
Is there an argument that the language of the anti-retaliation provision, by itself, is ambiguous with respect to third-party retaliations?
Perhaps. The statute refers to retaliation against an employee because
“he” has engaged in protected activity. This suggests that the protection
of the provision extends only to individuals who have engaged in protected activity themselves. Yet, to reach that conclusion, one must infer
that Congress used these terms in an exclusive sense. That is a fair inference but not an immutable one.
It is generally understood, under the maxim of “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,” that where “the persons and things to which [a statute]
refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be
understood as exclusions.” 139 That maxim, however, simply supports an
“inference” of exclusivity. Courts have emphasized that, because “not
every silence is pregnant,” expressio unius is “an uncertain guide to interpreting statutes.” 140 Courts have cautioned that the expressio unius
maxim is “often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in
the construction of statutes or documents.” 141 That the anti-retaliation
provision does not specifically refer to third-party retaliations does not,
by necessity, rule out the possibility that Congress intended to cover
such retaliations.
Further, the exclusive reading of the statute rests entirely on the
term “he.” “He” may not be ambiguous in the same way that “employee” was ambiguous in Robinson. Yet, the term may be broad enough to
encompass at least some cases of third-party retaliation. For example, if
an employer retaliates against a husband because his wife has filed a
138. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 397, 341 (1997).
139. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 304-05
(6th ed. 2001).
140. Ill. Dep’t of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1983).
141. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927).
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charge of discrimination, one could plausibly say, due to the closeness of
the relationship, that retaliation against one is retaliation against the other. The “he,” in that context, is interchangeable. In a similar vein,
where an employer retaliates against Employee A because Employee B
has acted on Employee A’s behalf in opposing discrimination in the
workplace, Employee A has not, himself, engaged in protected activity.
Yet, another employee, acting as Employee A’s representative has.
Could it not be said that Employee A is the “he” referenced in the statute, in the sense that someone engaged in protected activity on his behalf?
Certainly, these are not the strongest textual arguments. And if
there were nothing more to it, these arguments might well fail. The
point here, however, is not to win the case on these arguments alone, but
to pave the way for the context-based arguments to follow. To use a
boxing metaphor, these points serve to soften the opponent, in this case,
the hard-line textualist judge. Having accomplished that, the question is
whether the party can deliver the knockout punch on the basis of a textual argument rooted in the broader context of the statute.
As it turns out, the broader context of the statute strongly points
against the restrictive reading of the anti-retaliation provision. The restrictive reading of the anti-retaliation provision reflects an “every man
for himself” perspective, where the scope of statutory protection for unlawful retaliation is coterminous with an individual’s own protected activity. However, Title VII rejects such a “first person” view of the enforcement process. Title VII expressly authorizes the filing of charges
on behalf of third parties. 142 Moreover, under Title VII an individual
who has not timely filed a charge can rely on the timely charge of another employee in pursuing a claim that arises out of “’similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.’” 143 Reflecting a holistic approach
to enforcement of the statute, Title VII encourages individuals to file
charges on behalf of their fellow workers and extends the protection of
the statute to individuals who have not participated in the enforcement
process themselves. 144
These features of Title VII are critical. The anti-retaliation provision does not stand alone. It is part of a statutory framework that seeks
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2001).
143. Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Snell v. Suffolk
County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1100 (2d Cir. 1986)).
144. See generally EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the “purpose of the charge . . . is not to seek [individual] recovery from the employer but rather to
inform the EEOC of possible discrimination”).
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to root out discrimination through a process of informal complaint, administrative dispute resolution and litigation. Why in the world would
Congress outlaw retaliation, permit employees to benefit from the protected activity (e.g., charge-filing) of others and then leave the employer
free to retaliate with impunity against those employee-beneficiaries? At
the very least, there is an uncomfortable fit between the restrictive reading of the anti-retaliation provision and the Act’s enforcement provisions. This supports an argument that the statute is ambiguous on the
precise issue of whether the anti-retaliation provision protects against
third-party retaliation.
Assuming the statute is ambiguous, the case for coverage becomes
compelling because the manifest purpose of the anti-retaliation provision
is to maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” 145
The “filing of charges and the giving of information by employees” is
essential to the enforcement of Title VII and “the carrying out of the
congressional policy embodied in the Act.” 146 If an employer was permitted to engage in third-party reprisals with impunity, the employer
could end run the anti-retaliation provision and subvert the enforcement
objectives of Title VII. An employer could discharge workers in retaliation for organized opposition activities, thereby undermining the ability
of unions or other organizations to wage campaigns against discriminatory practices. Further, to the extent that the workers had not engaged in
opposition activity themselves, they would not be protected by the statute. Additionally, an employer could adopt a policy of seeking reprisals
in any case where an employee protested discrimination, filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or otherwise participated in the enforcement process. That policy could require the termination of any relative, friend, or co-worker of the individual engaging
in the protected activity. It makes no sense for Congress to have left
such a gaping hole in the protections of the anti-retaliation provision.
The observant reader will note that, at this point, the argument for
coverage is not unlike the argument one would make under the textual
end run approach. The difference is that, under the textual bypass approach, the party reaches this point of the argument only after first distilling the text and persuading the court that the statutory language is ambiguous. The lesson here is obvious. The end point, in either case, is the
same. The question is how to get to that end point in a way that meets
the demands of the now-prevailing textualist paradigm.

145. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
146. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
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V. CONCLUSION
The shift to a more textualist approach to statutory interpretation
places new demands on the practitioner. In prior eras, a party seeking to
expand the scope of protection under a federal statute could do so without much regard for text; the party could invoke the remedial purpose of
the statute, talk a lot about the limits of literalism, and argue the case as
a matter of statutory policy and logic. The new textualism has changed
the legal landscape. Yet, the new textualism may have given back with
one hand what it has taken with the other.
This article has attempted to show how one can use textual rhetoric
to achieve a result that, at first blush, may appear contra-textual. It constructed this argument by using the road map provided by the Supreme
Court itself. Textualism may be here to stay, but, within the textualist
framework, there is a surprising amount of give in the joints. It is the
job of the practitioner, seeking to overcome the literal terms of a statute,
to find that give.
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